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DIGITAL DEMOCRACY: ANDERSON V. BELL & THE EXPANSION 
OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN ELECTION LAW 
 
Barry G. Stratford* 
 
Technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand 





I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The law has long recognized electronic signatures as legally effective where 
hand-signed signatures are required. As early as 1869, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court acknowledged the validity of a contract accepted by telegraph.
2
 
The court made observations about the application of technology to law that proves 
insightful even today: 
 
[I]t makes no difference whether [the telegraph] operator writes the offer 
or the acceptance in the presence of his principal and by his express 
direction, with a steel pen an inch long attached to an ordinary penholder, 
or whether his pen be a copper wire a thousand miles long. In either case 
the thought is communicated to the paper by the use of the finger resting 
upon the pen; nor does it make any difference that in one case common 
record ink is used, while in the other case a more subtle fluid, known as 




Over the past decade, electronic signatures
4
 have become increasingly 
accepted under the laws of most jurisdictions. For example, in 2000, the United 
States Congress enacted legislation ensuring the validity of transactions and 
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 For a general description of varying types of electronic signatures, which includes 
digital signatures, public key cryptography, biometric devices, and smart cards, see 
WARWICK FORD & MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1997); SIMSON 
GARFINKEL & GENE SPAFFORD, WEB SECURITY AND COMMERCE 187-208 (1997); JANE K. 
WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 1.04[E] (4th ed. 
2009). 
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contracts entered into through electronic signatures.
5
 Since that time, forty-seven 
states have also passed legislation making electronic signatures a legitimate and 
streamlined aspect of the law.
6
 
On June 22, 2010, the Utah Supreme Court dramatically expanded the 
recognition and validity of electronic signatures in Anderson v. Bell.
7
 The court 
held electronic signatures are legally effective and enforceable when qualifying a 
candidate for the ballot under Utah’s Election Code.
8
 Utah has a tradition of 
treating electronic signatures progressively in the law; for example, it was the first 
state in the nation to enact legislation designed to facilitate electronic transactions
9
 
between parties with no prior business relationship.
10
 Furthering this tradition, the 
court’s decision in Anderson placed Utah in the forefront of the merger between 
technology, law, and democratic governance. 
The decision has been hailed as “a huge step forward in recognizing the legal 
efficacy of electronic signatures that may reverberate around the nation.”
11
 The 
incorporation of electronic signatures in election law would likely have a positive 
impact on access and involvement in democratic participation, especially with 
citizen-led initiatives and referenda. 
Part II of this Note examines the laws surrounding electronic signatures, 
including the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act 
(E-SIGN)
12
 and Utah’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (the UETA).
13
 This 
section also discusses the novel application of electronic signatures in the area of 
election law in the Utah Supreme Court’s Anderson decision. 
Part III of this Note argues that the expansion of electronic signatures in 
election law is a logical extension of E-SIGN and the UETA. Specifically, this 
Note argues that the Utah Supreme Court’s application of electronic signatures in 
qualifying a candidate for the ballot was proper. Part IV further advocates that 
lawmakers should incorporate the use of electronic signatures into the election 
                                                        
5
 See infra text accompanying notes 17–33. 
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 At that time, the technology focused specifically on the use of “digital signatures” 
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 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2006). 
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code wherever feasible. This section will also discuss the implications resulting 
from the normalization of electronic signatures in election law, including an 
argument that such normalizations will increase citizen participation in our 
nation’s long-revered democratic processes. In particular, initiative and referendum 
petitions would likely see increased use throughout the states. Part V concludes. 
 
II.  FOUNDATIONS OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN THE LAW 
 
While the law has long incorporated electronic signatures as legally effective 
where hand-signed signatures are required,
14
 some commentators believe the 
electronic signature statutes of the last decade are “rare examples of law leading 
technology.”
15
 Ever since the passage of federal and state uniform acts recognizing 
the validity of electronic signatures, the “technology has been catching up to the 
law.”
16
 To give context to the court’s decision in Anderson, this section examines 
both the federal E-SIGN and Utah’s version, the UETA. 
 
A.  The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act 
 
On June 30, 2000, President Clinton signed E-SIGN into law using a smart 
card that allowed him to sign the bill through the use of an electronic signature.
17
 
The legislation established the validity of electronic signatures for interstate and 
international commerce where “a signature, contract, or other record relating to 
such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely 
because it is in electronic form . . . .”
18
 The act was designed to “place[] electronic 
records and signatures on a legal par with their paper and ink counterparts.”
19
 
E-SIGN defines an “electronic signature” as “an electronic sound, symbol or 
process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and 
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.”
20
 Therefore, a 
digital signature using public key infrastructure technology, a typed name, or a PIN 
would qualify as a valid signature under the law.
21
 E-SIGN further specified that 
electronic signatures are voluntary, as the Act does not “require any person to 
agree to use or accept electronic records or electronic signatures.”
22
 To that effect, 
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 See, e.g., Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487 (1869) (recognizing electronic 
signatures in the context of the telegraph). 
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 Dave Wreski, Clinton to E-SIGN Digital Signature Law, LINUXSECURITY.COM, 
http://www.linuxsecurity.com/content/view/107946/169/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
18
 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(1) (2006). 
19
 See Wittie & Winn, supra note 9, at 297. 
20
 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5) (2006). 
21
 See Susan H. Siegfried, The E-Commerce Revolution: E-SIGN and UETA (June 
20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.simply-easier-acord-
forms.com/support-files/susansiegried.pdf [sic] (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
22
 15 U.S.C. § 7001(b)(2). 
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the legislation requires that consumers agree to the transactions that use electronic 
signatures: “consumer disclosure” must be used to show that the consumer 
“consent[s] electronically . . . in a manner that reasonably demonstrates that the 
consumer can access information in the electronic form that will be used to provide 
the information that is the subject of the consent.”
23
 
The legislation also provides for the accuracy and availability of the electronic 
record that is created.
24
 Once a user enters an electronic signature, E-SIGN 
specifies that for any “statute, regulation, or other rule of law requir[ing]”
25
 
retention of a document, the requirement can be met through “retaining an 
electronic record” rather than a paper record.
26
 All parties must be given access to 
the electronic record with the electronic signature.
27
 The record must be in a format 
that is both accurate and accessible.
28
 
Beyond these basic requirements, the legislation does not specify or endorse 
any particular type of technology, allowing for continual software and hardware 
development.
29
 This also provides greater flexibility and market competition for 




E-SIGN also places some limits on electronic signatures. It excludes 
application to wills, codicils, testamentary trusts, adoptions, divorces, other matters 
of family law, or most sections of the Uniform Commercial Code.
31
 It also does 
not apply to court orders, notices, official court documents, notice of the 
cancellation of utilities, default, acceleration, or to foreclosures.
32
 
Thus, E-SIGN establishes the legal efficacy of electronic signatures in federal 
law and provides additional validation for the use of electronic signatures in 
transactions. It also serves as the federal counterpart to state laws recognizing 
electronic signatures. 
 
                                                        
23
 Id. § 7001(c)(1)(C)(ii). 
24
 Id. § 7001. 
25 
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26
 Id. § 7001(d)(1). 
27
 Id. § 7001(d)(1)(B). 
28
 Id. § 7001(d)(1)(B). 
29
 Guidance on Implementing the Electronic Signatures in Global National 
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 See generally Siegfied, supra note 21. 
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 15 U.S.C. § 7003(a). Specifically, the statute does not apply to sections 1-107, 1-
206, and Articles 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. § 7003(a)(3). 
32
 Id. § 7003(b). 
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B.  The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in Utah 
 
The UETA was the result of a proposal by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
33
 Like E-SIGN, the UETA provides “a 
legal framework for the use of electronic signatures and records in government or 
business transactions.”
34
 Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and the Virgin Islands have all adopted a uniform or modified version of the Act.
35
 
While Illinois, New York, and Washington are the only states that have yet to 
adopt some version of the UETA, all three states have passed other statutes 
validating the use of electronic signatures in certain situations.
36
 
States that have adopted the UETA have the authority to “modify, limit or 
supersede some E-SIGN provisions, including its consumer protection 
provisions.”
37
 This can be done so long as the statute does not favor a specific 
technology and, if adopted after E-SIGN, where a state explicitly indicates an 
intention to override the E-SIGN Act.
38
 Otherwise, E-SIGN will “govern[] in the 
absence of a state law or where states have made modifications to the UETA that 
are inconsistent with E-SIGN.”
39
 
In 2000, the Utah Legislature enacted its own version of the UETA.
40
 Like the 
provisions of E-SIGN, Utah’s UETA provides for a number of definitions 
important to electronic signatures and electronic records.
41
 Additionally, the Utah 
UETA specifies formatting requirements, record and check retention rules, rules 
permitting electronic originals, rules on notarization, and rules for electronic 
agents.
42
 The Utah UETA specifically excludes electronic signatures from wills, 
codicils, testamentary trusts, and Articles 3 through 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.
43
 Additionally, it grants administrative agencies the authority to determine 
when and if government documents will be filed electronically and permits 
regulators to establish record retention requirements for mandatory records for 
                                                        
33




 Id.; see also UNIF. ELECT. TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 1–21 (West 2010). For the 
original draft version and commentary, see Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs of Unif. State 
Laws, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (1999) [hereinafter NCCUSL], available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 
2012). 
36
 UETA, supra note 13; Electronic Commerce Security Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 175/5-105 (West 2005); Electronic Signature and Records Act, N.Y. STATE TECH 
LAW § 301 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2012); Electronic Authentication Act, WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 19.34.010 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012). 
37
 See UETA, supra note 13. 
38
 See generally Wittie & Winn, supra note 9, at 324. 
39
 See UETA, supra note 13. 
40
 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-4-101 to -503 (LexisNexis 2009). 
41
 Id. § 46-4-102. 
42
 Id. §§ 46-4-202 to -501. 
43
 Id. § 46-4-103. 
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government inspection, review, or audit.
44
 Both E-SIGN and the UETA provide 
the context and validity for the use of electronic signatures that underlie the Utah 
Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Bell. 
 
C.  Anderson v. Bell 
 
In 2010, Farley Anderson, a Utah resident, “entrepreneur, inventor, author, 
publisher, teacher, lecturer, husband[,] and father of 11” began his independent 
campaign to become the governor of Utah.
45
 Under Utah’s Election Code, a 
candidate not affiliated with a registered political party must collect the signatures 
of 1,000 registered voters to run for governor.
46
 Mr. Anderson collected more than 
the 1,000 required signatures in order to qualify his candidacy for governor of Utah 
on the 2010 election ballot.
47
 However, not all of the signatures were hand-signed, 
as many were gathered electronically through a campaign website.
48
 
In compliance with the procedures outlined in the Utah Election Code, Mr. 
Anderson submitted the signatures to county clerks for verification that each signer 
was a registered voter and had not signed the petition for any other unaffiliated 
candidate.
49
 Of the signatures submitted, clerks in seven counties certified 1,055 
signatures as valid.
50
 Armed with the requisite signatures and a completed 
certificate of nomination, Mr. Anderson submitted his petition of candidacy on 
March 19, 2010, to the Utah Lieutenant Governor’s Office.
51
 
Lieutenant Governor Greg Bell took the position that electronic signatures do 
not constitute a valid signature under the Utah Election Code and excised the 
electronic signatures from Mr. Anderson’s nomination.
52
 Subsequently, Bell 
rejected Mr. Anderson’s candidacy for failing to obtain the required 1,000 
signatures.
53
 Mr. Anderson filed a petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah 
Supreme Court arguing, among other things, that electronic signatures plainly 
satisfy the requirements of the Utah Election Code.
54
 Furthermore, the petition 
alleged that Bell overstepped his authority in defining what constitutes a signature 
subject to removal from a certificate of nomination.
55
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 Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, VOTE.UTAH.GOV, 12, http://www.scribd.com/ 
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 Id. at 1149. The court declined to address Mr. Anderson’s other claims given their 
“ultimate holding that an electronic signature satisfies the signature mandate imposed on 
unaffiliated candidates.” Id. 
55
 Id. 
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The court distilled the petition as asking “a single, distinctive question: what 
is a ‘signature’ under [Utah’s Election Code]? Or more specifically, does an 
electronic signature qualify as a valid signature under this statutory subsection?”
56
 
From the outset, the court emphasized that the statutory language requires the court 
to construe the framework covering unaffiliated candidates to give them “every 
reasonable opportunity to make their candidacy effective.”
57
 
The court noted that the Legislature had never defined the relevant terms of 
“signature,” “signed,” or “completed” in the Utah Election Code.
58
 The court did 
recognize, however, that there were “strong statutory indicators” elsewhere in the 
Utah Code that a signature was not exclusive to a name or mark as written by a 
person or at a person’s direction.
59
 Specifically, section 68-3-12—which outlines 
the rules of construction as to words and phrases of the entire Utah Code—directs 
courts to observe these definitions unless they would be “inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the Legislature” or “repugnant to the context of the statute.”
60
 
Moreover, the court looked to section 68-3-12 in determining the definition of 
the term “signature.”
61
 Under this section, this definition includes a “name, mark, 
or sign written with the intent to authenticate any instrument or writing.”
62
 The 
Legislature defined “writing” to include “information stored in an electronic or 
other medium if the information is retrievable in a perceivable format.”
63
 Taking 
these definitions together, the court determined that electronic signatures were 
explicitly contemplated by the Legislature under section 68-3-12.
64
 
Central to the court’s decision was the recognition that the definitions of 
“signature” and “writing” appeared to be far less concerned with the form of the 
signature than they are concerned with the intent of the signer.
65
 This emphasis on 
intent mirrors the importance that Utah courts have acknowledged in common 
law.
66




                                                        
56
 Id. at 1150. 
57
 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-501(3) (2007)). 
58
 Id. The Utah Election Code provides definitions, but does not include those terms. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-102 (LexisNexis 2009). 
59
 Id. at 1151–52. 
60
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-12(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2008). 
61
 Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1151–52. 
62
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-12.5(24). 
63
 Id. § 68-3-12.5(33). 
64




 See, e.g., State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah 1983) (finding an imprinted 
name of a judge made by a court clerk a “signature”); Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 425 P.2d 
773, 774 (Utah 1967) (discussing that it is the intent, rather than the form, of the act that is 
important). 
67
 See, e.g., 17A AM. JUR. Contracts § 176 (2011) (stating that “a signature is 
whatever mark, symbol, or device one may choose to employ to represent oneself, and may 
include fingerprints. . . . ‘Electronic’ signatures are valid, and legislation has been enacted 
specifically to authorize them” (footnotes omitted)); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1415 (8th 
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The court then turned to Utah’s version of the Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act and its implication on the Election Code.
68
 The UETA defines an 
electronic signature as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process . . . executed or 
adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.”
69
 Thus, the court reasoned 
that once again, the statutory language indicates that the intent of the signer, rather 
than the form, was the Legislature’s emphasis.
70
 
The UETA is explicit about the use of electronic signatures: “[i]f a law 
requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.”
71
 Mr. Anderson’s 
argument relied on the proposition that this statute applies equally to other areas of 
the Utah Code, including the Election Code.
72
 When the UETA was enacted, the 
Utah Legislature enumerated a number of transactions that were excluded from the 
UETA.
73
 It did not, however, generally exclude the Election Code. Nor did it 
specifically exclude campaigning, qualifying a candidate for the ballot, qualifying 
a ballot proposition, the formation of a political party, or anything else regarding 
the topic of elections. While observing that the omission does not qualify as a 
“legislative endorsement,” the court found that the lack of a specific exclusion for 
the Election Code was noteworthy.
74
 The court concluded that UETA statutory 




The court’s analysis then shifted to refuting the arguments advanced by 
Lieutenant Governor Bell. Though Mr. Anderson’s argument seemed to be a 
logical interpretation of the statute, the lieutenant governor disputed this reading. 
Lieutenant Governor Bell argued that certain subsections of the UETA were 
designed to grant state agencies broad authority to choose whether or not to 
conduct state business through electronic means and that forcing his office to 
accept Mr. Anderson’s electronic signatures would violate the plain language of 
those subsections.
76
 This argument relies on the following provision: 
 
A state governmental agency may, by following the procedures and 
requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act, make rules that: (a) identify specific transactions that the agency is 
willing to conduct by electronic means; (b) identify specific transactions 
that the agency will never conduct by electronic means . . . .
77
 
                                                        
ed. 2004) (defining a signature as “[a]ny name, mark, or writing used with the intention of 
authenticating a document”). 
68
 Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1152. 
69
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-102(8) (LexisNexis 2005). 
70
 Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1152. 
71
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-201(4). 
72
 Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1148. 
73
 UTAH CODE ANN. §46-4-202. 
74






 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-501(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2009). 




The court rejected Lieutenant Governor Bell’s contention that allowing Mr. 
Anderson’s candidacy would “force his office, in contravention of the plain 




The court noted that Lieutenant Governor Bell had “done nothing to 
promulgate rules for electronic records” under the rulemaking procedures required 
by Title 63G.
79
 As the court recognized, holding otherwise would disregard the 
rulemaking component of the statute.
80
 Such a reading would establish precedent 
that anytime a state agency had not promulgated rules regarding electronic 
signatures, the agency, by default, would not conduct business through electronic 
means. The court emphasized that the rulemaking requirement was “critical” to 
prevent “informal decisions” made on a case-by-case basis.
81
 
The court acknowledged that Lieutenant Governor Bell’s second argument—
claiming subsection 46-4-501(4), which controls the creation and retention of 
electronic records and conversion of written records by governmental agencies, as 
expressly allowing his office to refuse Mr. Anderson’s certificate of nomination—
was “plausible,” if read in isolation.
82
 Subsection 4 specifies that “nothing in this 
chapter requires any state governmental agency to: (a) conduct transactions by 




Nonetheless, the court rejected this reading of the statute. The court found that 
Lieutenant Governor Bell’s contention “loses its persuasive effect” when 
“harmoniz[ing] this subsection with the rest of section 46-4-501, the remainder of 
the UETA, [the Utah Code’s rules of statutory construction], and the Election 
Code.”
84
 To construe subsection 46-4-501(4) in the manner that Bell advanced 
would expressly contradict the UETA for several reasons.
85
 First, the UETA 
expressly permits any law requiring a signature to be satisfied by an electronic 
signature.
86
 Second, the UETA mandates that an electronic signature “may not be 
denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.”
87
 
The court also noted that the UETA requires the Act “be construed and 
applied: (1) to facilitate electronic transactions” and “(2) to be consistent with 
reasonable practices concerning electronic transactions and with the continued 
                                                        
78










 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-501(4) (LexisNexis 2009). 
84
 Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1154 (citing Sill v. Hart, 162 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Utah 2007)) 
(stating that part of the court’s attempt to determine a statute’s plain language is to construe 
the statute at issue “with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole”). 
85
 Id. at 1154–55. 
86
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-201(4). 
87
 Id. § 46-4-201(1). 
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expansion of those practices.”
88
 A “transaction” is “an action or set of actions 
occurring between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, 
commercial, or governmental affairs.”
89
  
Lieutenant Governor Bell argued that Mr. Anderson’s method of acquiring 
signatures did not qualify as a transaction as defined under the UETA.
90
 The court 
recognized, however, that Lieutenant Governor Bell’s position accomplishes just 
the opposite, “curb[ing] electronic transactions rather than facilitat[ing] them.”
91
 
Beyond the narrow exceptions enumerated by the Utah Legislature, the court found 




The lieutenant governor also argued that as the chief election officer for Utah, 
he is a “party” to the signing transaction and must agree to the use of electronic 
signatures.
93
 This argument rests on the UETA’s application “only to transactions 
between parties each of which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic 
means.”
94
 The court was not persuaded, noting, “the would-be candidate circulates 
a petition for nomination to registered voters.”
95
 Because a petition for nomination 
is submitted to country clerks for verification only after the petition is “completed 
by” 1,000 registered voters,
96
 the court read the term “completed” to mean that the 
“transaction” had already closed.
97
 
The UETA defines a “transaction” as “an action or set of actions occurring 
between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial, or 
governmental affairs.”
98
 The court reasoned that “treating the transaction as 
between the circulating nominee and the signer makes the most logical sense; it is 
an authentication that the signee supports the circulator’s bid to have his name on 
the ballot as a candidate for statewide office.”
99
 Therefore, the court rejected the 
argument that including the lieutenant governor as a party would impact the 
transaction or the authentication of a signer’s support.
100
 
The court then took time to address the lieutenant governor’s argument that 
electronic signatures are more susceptible to fraud and should not be given the 
level of credence that paper signatures would be. The court noted: 
 
                                                        
88




 Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1155. 
91
 Id. at 1154–55. 
92




 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-105(2)(a). 
95
 Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1155 (emphasis added). 
96
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-502(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). 
97
 Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1155. 
98
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-102(16) (LexisNexis 2005). 
99
 Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1155. 
100
 Id. 
56 UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW [No. 1 
 
 
The Lt. Governor . . . contends that electronic signatures attached to 
a certificate of nomination lack “apparent authority” as genuine 
signatures. This position is based on a theory that a holographic signature 
is self-authenticating because the reviewing party may merely look at the 
signature and see that someone put pen to paper to sign [his or her] 
name. In contrast, an electronic signature lacks apparent authority, 
because it appears as a typed list of names. . . . We are unpersuaded that 
an electronic signature presents special concerns regarding candidate 
fraud; a candidate could as easily handwrite or type fraudulent names 




The court also recognized that “electronic signatures may be a better deterrent to 
candidate fraud because an electronic signature incorporates readily verifiable 
personal, but not-public, information.”
102
 As an example, the court noted “the 
signers of Mr. Anderson’s petition apparently had to enter a security code that 
corresponds to the last four digits of their driver’s license number before their 
signature would be counted.”
103
 
The court concluded by holding that Lieutenant Governor Bell exceeded his 
authority as Utah’s chief election officer when he “excised the electronic 
signatures attached to Mr. Anderson’s certificate of nomination.”
104
 The court 
granted Mr. Anderson his writ of extraordinary relief and instructed the lieutenant 
governor to recount the signatures submitted by Mr. Anderson.
105
 Subsequently, 
Mr. Anderson was placed on the 2010 ballot as a candidate for Utah Governor, 
losing the election with 11,842 votes, or only 1.99%.
106
 
In 2011, the Utah Legislature viscerally reacted to the Utah Supreme Court’s 
holding in Anderson. The Utah Legislature amended the Election Code to prohibit 
electronic signatures.
107
 Additionally, the Legislature specified that holographic 
signatures alone are sufficient for Utah election purposes.
108
 These changes not 
only abolished the holding in Anderson but also eliminated any chance that 
electronic signatures could be used for the other election procedures, such as 
organizing a political party or putting forward citizen-led initiatives or referenda. 
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D.  Utah Should Incorporate Electronic Signatures into the Election Code 
 
For reasons discussed below, the Utah Legislature should reconsider its 
reactionary measures undercutting the Anderson decision and once again make 
Utah a leader in embracing the legitimate and logical use of electronic signatures 
in the law. Through Anderson, Utah became the first state to recognize the use of 
electronic “transactions” in the context of election law by allowing electronic 
signatures to qualify Mr. Anderson for the ballot.
109
 Reading Utah’s UETA as 
permitting and encouraging electronic signatures outside of traditional business 
transactions is novel.
110
 The Anderson decision should serve as the basis for a 
broader trend among the states in recognizing the validity of electronic signatures 
in election law where a signer would otherwise physically handle a piece of paper 
and sign his or her name with a pen. 
 
III.  THE LOGICAL EXPANSION OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN ELECTION LAW 
 
The Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning in Anderson is sound. The UETA 
“applies to electronic records and electronic signatures relating to a transaction.”
111
 
The language stating that where the law “requires a signature, an electronic 
signature satisfies the law” could not be more straightforward.
112
 The UETA 
dictates that it “be construed and applied: (1) to facilitate electronic transactions” 
and “(2) to be consistent with reasonable practices concerning electronic 
transactions and with the continued expansion of those practices.”
113
 
Thus, when applied to various election law contexts—such as qualifying 
independent candidates for the ballot, petitions to organize and register political 
parties, and qualifying ballot propositions such as recalls, initiatives, and 
referenda—a legitimate “transaction” between petitioners and signatories is 
formed. In all of these situations, the signing and submitting electronic signatures 
to the government for authentication constitutes a completed “transaction” because 




States should encourage their regulatory agencies and governmental 
departments to use electronic signatures and documents where feasible. Many 
areas of the law could benefit from the convenience and cost savings associated 
with using electronic signatures and electronic records rather than their paper 
counterparts. These benefits include saving time through the elimination of 
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signing, scanning, faxing, and mailing.
115
 Additionally, electronic signatures and 
records reduce waiting time where a transaction can be completed in seconds.
116
 
Electronic signatures also reduce the costs of paper, ink, and postage.
117
 
Additionally, all parties immediately receive a copy of the transaction, making it 
easier to file and refer to later.
118
 Additionally, many electronic signature services 
include archiving ability to store the documents in one easily accessible location.
119
 
Finally, electronic signatures allow for digital encryptions that provide an 
increased level of security against fraud.
120
 
One expert believes that the court’s analysis in Anderson will persuade others 
to embrace electronic signatures on a broader scale, noting, “companies and 
individuals have been slow to implement the available . . . legislation aimed at 
encouraging and validating electronic commerce and electronic signatures.”
121
 
Given the advancements of technology and validation evidenced by Anderson, 
states that have adopted the UETA should add language strongly encouraging or 
requiring agencies to use electronic signatures and electronic records. Congress 
and the president should encourage the same for federal agencies. 
The use of electronic signatures can find particular application to the Election 
Code. Such a reading is consistent with the UETA’s purpose of facilitating 
electronic transactions and encouraging technology developments relating to 
electronic signatures.
122
 The validity of using an electronic signature to sign a 
petition as a “transaction” between the government and its citizenry to recall a 
wayward politician should be no less legitimate than when a “transaction” for a 
major purchase with a credit card or when electronically committing to a million-
dollar contract. Other states should embrace their roles as “laboratories of 
democracy” and follow Utah’s lead in recognizing that electronic signatures are a 
valid “transaction” within the context of election law.
123
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One commentator criticized the Anderson decision for creating unintended 
consequences and “a Pandora’s box of election law issues.”
124
 But legislators can 
easily review their state’s election code to ensure that there is a fair and orderly 
process to accommodate independent candidates capable of creating web-based 
campaigns validated entirely by electronic signatures. 
Nor is fraud a realistic concern.
125
 A candidate who produces a typed list of 
fraudulent names of electronic signatures could just as easily hand-write fraudulent 
names onto a petition or certificate of nomination. In fact, electronic signatures 
may be a better deterrent to this type of election fraud. The Anderson opinion 
provides such an example: signers were prompted to enter a security code 
corresponding to the last four digits of their driver’s license number before their 
signature would be included in the petition.
126
 
These considerations are not legitimate excuses to slow the inevitable 
acceptance of technology in the law, particularly in the context of election law. 
Legislatures should avoid any confusion by preempting judicial recognition of the 
validity of electronic signatures and conform their Election Codes to their state’s 
UETA. Doing so would prevent costly litigation and preserve state resources. 
The logical inferences of the court’s holding in Anderson would permit the 
use of an electronic signature into other areas of the Election Code requiring a 
signature. There is no compelling reason that an electronic signature should be any 
less valid when qualifying a candidate for the ballot than for signing a petition to 
organize and register a political party or to qualify a citizen-driven referendum or 
initiative for the ballot. Other states should recognize that a UETA “transaction” 
applies in the context of election law. 
 
IV.  EXPANDING ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN ELECTION LAW WOULD LEAD 
TO GREATER VOTER PARTICIPATION AND DISCOURSE 
 
By following the Utah Supreme Court’s lead, other states would benefit from 
increased citizen access to elections and self-governance, particularly involving the 
formation of political parties, initiatives, and referenda. As the American Civil 
Liberty Union of Utah noted, the Anderson decision has “the potential to 
significantly increase the ability of independent candidates to access the general 
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election ballot, and thus to increase the opportunity for minority viewpoints in 
Utah to be heard and considered in election years.”
127
 The implications extend 
beyond minority viewpoints, however, as a majority of voters may be inclined to 
pass an initiative or referendum.
128
 
Internet access and usage has exploded in the past decade.
129
 In 2000, 46% of 
adults used the Internet compared with 79% in 2010.
130
 The use of broadband in 
the home jumped from 5% to 64% during the same time.
131
 Less than 1% of adults 
connected wirelessly in 2000, compared to 58% in 2010.
132
 With such increases in 
the use of electronic resources, it is unsurprising that the Internet has readily been 
incorporated into politics and elections.
133
 
An initiative is “the process whereby citizens can adopt laws or amend [a] 
state constitution.”
134
 In order to succeed in placing a direct initiative on the ballot 
in Utah, proponents must gather signatures equal to 10% of the total votes cast in 
the last gubernatorial election.
135
 A direct initiative goes directly to the ballot, as 
opposed to an indirect initiative, which requires 5% of the total votes cast in the 




Popular referendum is the “process whereby citizens have the ability to send 
legislation passed by the legislature to a vote of the people to either accept or 
reject.”
137
 A referendum also requires that proponents gather signatures equal to 
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The number of citizens engaging in direct democracy through initiatives and 
referenda is increasing in states that allow their use.
139
 Access to technology is 
changing the way people become informed and involved in the political process, 
based largely on access to information and opinions on public policy.
140
 The use of 
electronic signatures in election law increases the ability of a democratic society to 
engage its elected representatives and take part in crafting public policy. The most 
rewarding prospects of expanding the use of electronic signatures into other 
aspects of the election code would come from increased participation by the public 
in representing their own interests. For example, this could be done through a 
popular movement’s formation into a new political party.
141
 The ease of signing an 
online petition for a particular cause would allow otherwise disenfranchised and 
poorly funded groups to come together and utilize the basic democratic tools 
available to the American citizenry. 
The ability for a citizenry to use electronic signatures would dramatically 
increase access to initiatives and referenda.
142
 This will “make the will of the 
people law on issues that elected officials are unwilling to address.”
143
 These 
opportunities of direct democracy could also provide “an effective check on [the] 
perceived influence by special interest groups” on elected officials who “are 
particularly susceptible to special interests and their financial influence.”
144
 
Thus, in the age of the Internet and blogosphere politics, the citizenry has 
more opportunities to ensure responsive representation. But when those elected 
officials fail to respond to the cries of the electorate, the people can harness the 
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expanding use of innovation and technology through electronic signatures, in order 
to enact or repeal laws for their own self-governance. 
The Utah Legislature should reconsider its post-Anderson reactionary 
legislation and allow for the expansion of electronic signatures in the Utah Election 
Code, once again making Utah a leader in embracing the legitimate and logical use 
of electronic signatures in the law. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Electronic signatures have become increasingly accepted in the law, but even 
so, validation and legitimacy come slowly. Congress and the various states have 
taken substantial steps to create uniform standards for electronic records and 
signatures through the passage of legislation like E-SIGN and UETA.
145
 
But as the Utah Supreme Court observed, there are other valid “transactions” 
in the law where these statutes should apply.
146
 In Anderson v. Bell, it applied to an 
independent candidate’s ballot qualification.
147
 The Utah Legislature disagreed, 
however, and amended the Utah Election Code to exclude electronic signatures.
148
 
This Note advocates expanding the reach of an electronic signature into other 
areas of election law. This includes instances involving qualifying independent 
candidates for the ballot; petitions to organize and register political parties; and 
qualifying ballot propositions such as recalls, initiatives, and referenda.
149
 This 
expansion of electronic signatures would increase the involvement of the electorate 
through the efficiency, ease, and reliability associated with the use of electronic 
signatures in election law.
150
 The use of electronic signatures in election law 
increases the ability of a democratic society to directly participate in crafting 
public policy and engage elected representatives. 
The Utah Legislature should reconsider its actions and apply the UETA to the 
Utah Election Code as a logical and worthwhile expansion of electronic signatures 
in the law. The inevitable march of technology will carry on. Electronic signatures 
should not be limited to commercial and business transactions but should apply to 
election codes where a physical signature has traditionally been required. The Utah 
Legislature should reclaim Utah’s historic place as a leader
151
 of expanding the use 
of electronic signatures in the law. 
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